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Health care research and policy increasingly emphasize 
shared decision making (Hibbard & Greene, 2013; Thille 
& Russell, 2010). However, research on shared decision 
making is often limited to examining isolated choice points 
and/or factors facilitating or hindering patient involve-
ment, without addressing the decision-making process 
itself (Bernabeo & Holmboe, 2013; Légaré & Witteman, 
2013). This approach reflects a limited understanding of 
the reasoning involved in shared decision making and of 
the factors that shape the distribution of clinical cognition 
among patients and health professionals.
As physical, organizational, and institutional work occur 
along a clinical illness trajectory (Strauss, Fagerhaugh, 
Suczek, & Wiener, 1995), so too clinical cognition is an 
ongoing process that occurs throughout the duration of 
care. Thus, a cognitive trajectory occurs in parallel with a 
patient’s illness trajectory. Medical decisions occur pre-
cisely when the current trajectory needs to be altered, 
prompting physicians and patients to share information and 
coordinate action (Elwyn et al., 2014; Epstein, 2013). To 
elaborate the ensuing, interrelated processes, we employ 
the paradigm of distributed cognition.
Distributed cognition locates thought as an emergent 
property of people interacting with other actors and the 
environment rather than a process inherently restricted to 
individual minds. This paradigm motivates the analysis of 
decision making as a social, physical, and cognitive process 
that integrates multiple actors’ perspectives (Cowley & 
Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013; Hutchins, 1995). Researchers 
have examined distributed cognition among medical practi-
tioners (Engeström, Engeström, & Kerosuo, 2003; Feufel, 
Robinson, & Shalin, 2011; Hazlehurst, McMullen, & 
Gorman, 2007). However, to date, little is known about 
how patients and health professionals engage in distributing 
clinical cognition (Lippa & Shalin, 2015).
To illuminate how this distributed cognitive system influ-
ences medical decision making, we first review established 
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Despite increasing prominence, little is known about the cognitive processes underlying shared decision making. To 
investigate these processes, we conceptualize shared decision making as a form of distributed cognition. We introduce 
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approaches to understanding medical decision making. 
Then, we present a Decision Space Model to classify the 
influences that determine and initiate decision needs and 
direct the unfolding decision-making processes. We con-
clude this introduction by expanding the Decision Space 
Model to accommodate the inherent distribution of func-
tions in the context of shared decision making.
Approaches to Understanding Medical 
Decision Making
Researchers have examined medical decision making 
using both quantitative and qualitative methods. On the 
quantitative side, laboratory studies have analyzed how 
individuals—mostly medical professionals or students—
process information to make decisions given predefined 
decision points and assumed medical solutions/evalua-
tion criteria (e.g., Croskerry, 2009). For example, cogni-
tive science researchers have made extensive comparisons 
between the diagnostic accuracy of physicians using sim-
ple decision rules that are adapted to answer specific 
diagnostic questions and domain-independent normative 
statistical models (e.g., Phang, Ravani, Schaefer, Wright, 
& McLaughlin, 2015; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). However, 
neither heuristic, intuition-based, nor more elaborate 
hypothetical-deductive decision models (Custers, 2013; 
Schwartz & Elstein, 2009) shed light on how decision 
points are identified, how relevant decision-making 
parameters are selected, or the definition of appropriate 
criteria for a “good” clinical decision.
Quantitative research focused on shared medical deci-
sion making typically examines a small number of factors 
(e.g., health literacy, diagnosis, intervention programs) in 
relation to specific outcomes (e.g., satisfaction with care, 
accurate risk assessment, disease status; Ghane, Huynh, 
Andrews, Tabuenca, & Sweeny, 2014; Hibbard & Greene, 
2013). By contrast, qualitative studies mainly examine the 
role of socio-cultural phenomena such as interpersonal 
dynamics, discourse, or power relations in decision mak-
ing (Corbin, 1998; Roter & Hall, 2006), but attend less to 
information flow and associated cognitive processes.
We argue that the process focus pertaining to most 
quantitative approaches and the impact of socio-cultural 
influences on decision making emphasized by most qual-
itative approaches are complementary. Both are neces-
sary to understand how decision points are identified and 
how relevant decision-making parameters are selected 
for making “good” clinical decisions. Clinical care 
involves parameters that are not well replicated in labora-
tory settings, and, in fact, contradicts some basic experi-
mental assumptions: In clinical care, decision points and 
outcome criteria are not given and situations are uncon-
trolled and unpredictable, in part, because multiple play-
ers influence the decision process (Klein & Wright, 
2016). Clinical decision making is a part of an ongoing 
trajectory complicated by fluctuating preferences, con-
textual constraints, and ambiguous task requirements 
(Broadstock & Michie, 2000). These contextual factors 
form a socio-cognitive landscape that is as inextricably 
linked to decision-making processes and outcomes as 
topography is to nautical navigation (Hutchins, 1995). 
We argue that when integrated into this socio-cognitive 
landscape, (shared) decision-making processes and 
related challenges such as misdiagnoses and non-adher-
ence may be better understood (Barber, 2002; Cameron, 
Leventhal, & Leventhal, 1993). We begin by identifying 
cognitive, physical, and social influences on the decision-
making process.
The Decision Space Model
We suggest the Decision Space Model in Figure 1 to 
specify and classify the physical, psychological, and 
social influences that shape individual decision making. 
The model was originally developed to describe physi-
cians’ decision making in acute care settings (Feufel, 
2009). The lower half of the figure is consistent with con-
structs in the classical literature on problem solving 
(Simon & Newell, 1971). The upper half of the figure is 
consistent with classical constructs in social science 
(Kleinman, 1980).
The Decision Space Model treats individual cognitive 
processes, environmental constraints (state space), and 
opportunities for action (action space) as functionally 
related but conceptually separable components of a dis-
tributed decision-making process. The state space consists 
of the properties of the task environment, where states 
evolve as a consequence of both human action and natural 
processes over time. The model differentiates physical 
constraints, such as resources, technology, and probabilis-
tic relationships between symptoms and diseases, as limits 
on the range of possible states. In medical settings, such 
physical considerations include the patient’s physiological 
status and the availability of resources to manipulate a 
patient’s status such as biomedical technology and treat-
ment options. Values enable a distinction between desir-
able states (potential goals) from undesirable states 
(potential problems). Values include personal or profes-
sional preferences related to culturally defined notions of 
health care, illness, and quality of life considerations.
The action space encompasses participants’ ability to 
generate desirable and acceptable states (e.g., March & 
Olsen, 2006). The range of feasible actions is limited by 
personal capacities, such as psychomotor or cognitive 
abilities. The range of acceptable action is limited by 
adopted norms, socially accepted rules governing action, 
including informally defined social roles as well as for-
malized institutional policies. In medical settings, this 
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may refer to the practice of limiting diagnostic proce-
dures to the level required to make and justify a treatment 
decision (Shalin & Bertram, 1996) or admit or discharge 
a patient (Feufel, 2009). In combination with the prevail-
ing state space, adopted norms determine the availability, 
selection, and sequencing of justifiable actions.
The Decision Space Model associates the need for 
decisions with potential changes in the trajectory for clin-
ical cognition and care. The need for a decision may 
result from natural progression along an illness trajectory 
or from the identification of undesirable and potentially 
remediable current states. Decision makers then select 
and combine parameters of the state space with options 
from the action space to consider in making the decision. 
Finally, evaluation of these options according to a system 
of values and norms yields the decision.
Toward an Understanding of Shared Medical 
Decision Making
Critically, in medical decision making, individual actors 
typically only have partial access to the full state and 
action spaces. Physicians and patients are working on the 
same problem, but their understandings of the decision 
space may differ. In the state space, the physician depends 
upon the patient for information about her state of health 
(e.g., symptoms and comorbidity) and personal values. 
Similarly, the patient depends upon the physician for bio-
medical information, such as symptom–disease contin-
gencies. In the action space, the physician depends upon 
the patient to adhere to treatment, whereas the patient 
depends upon the physician for access to treatments that 
require medical expertise or authority. In the action space, 
norms and personal capacities shape each actor’s contri-
bution to treatment. This inherent interdependence 
implies that shared decision making between physician 
and patient is a distributed cognitive process comparable 
with that between medical professionals (Engeström 
et al., 2003; Epstein, 2013; Feufel et al., 2011). Therefore, 
decision making must draw on the perspectives of both 
physician and patient to result in an effective cooperative 
system (Malone & Crowston, 1994).
Below, we support an extended version of the Decision 
Space Model to cover shared decision-making processes 
involving both physicians and patients (see Figure 2). 
Analysis focuses on the identification of patterns of deci-
sion making and how they reflect the sharing of the deci-
sion-making process in the Decision Space Model. 
Discussion concerns ramifications of these findings for 
extending conventional, theoretically driven notions of 
medical decision making and its practical applications.
Method
This study draws on two data sets focused on physician–
patient interactions, one collected in Emergency 
Departments (Feufel, 2009) and the other collected in a 
clinic specializing in Multiple Sclerosis (Lippa & Shalin, 
2015). Initially separate data analyses revealed findings 
that were mutually reinforcing. Preliminary investigation 
of the Multiple Sclerosis data focused on the decision-
making process and yielded four decision patterns, dif-
ferentiating the particular contributions of physicians and 
patients in medical decision making. Preliminary analysis 
of the Emergency Department data focused on influences 
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Figure 1. The decision space for a single actor.
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and led to the development of the Decision Space Model. 
Because both studies used field observations and inter-
views for similar conceptual reasons but looked at differ-
ent forms of medical care, this article uses both data sets 
as a means of data triangulation to support the generaliz-
ability of results and identifies the common contextual 
factors that influence the decision processes presented. 
Below, we describe the conceptual perspective for both 
studies, the separate processes of data collection and ini-
tial analyses, and the common final analysis.
Conceptual Perspective
Both studies originated from a concern for the psycho-
logical considerations that inform the design of efficient 
work systems and technology. The research was moti-
vated by the belief that design recommendations depend 
on understanding how medical decisions are made in 
context. Such an understanding requires a combination of 
knowledge about medical practice and a broad theoretical 
conceptualization of medical decision making. However, 
much of the prevailing theory assumed both pre-specified 
decision points and evaluation criteria. Accordingly, the 
researchers chose to collect data through field observa-
tions and interviews to capture physicians’ decision 
making in context when interacting with patients, to 
ground a theoretical model of medical decision making.
Data Collection
Both studies used participant observation during patient–
physician interactions and conversations with informants 
in the field (medical and clerical staff). The researchers 
attempted to keep their role as unobtrusive as possible to 
minimize influence on the interaction. However, all the 
participants were aware of the researcher’s presence and 
interest in “reasoning processes,” creating potential for 
altering interactions. All consent procedures were 
approved by institutional review boards (IRBs) at the 
researchers’ home university and the medical facilities 
where data were collected.
The Multiple Sclerosis data were collected through a 
specialty care center at a large, Midwestern medical 
school. Two board-certified neurologists (with 11 and 17 
years of experience) and 16 patients (three men and 13 
women) participated. Four participants had a high school 
level education, seven were college educated, three had a 
post-graduate education, and two did not wish to discuss 
their educational background. Patients represented a wide 
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Figure 2. The integration of physician and patient perspectives to a mutually acceptable decision space.
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diagnosed to having lived with the disease for decades. 
Physician and patient participants provided written con-
sent. Approximately 65 hours were spent making obser-
vations. Data collection included audio recording and/or 
detailed field notes depending upon the comfort of the 
participants. To provide as rich a description as possible, 
the examples below are drawn from audio recordings. 
Within 14 days of the initial observations, follow-up 
interviews were conducted with all patients including 
general questions and focused discussion of problems 
and decisions from the clinical session. These interviews 
facilitated the initial analysis by Lippa and Shalin (2015) 
in providing additional contextual information, clarifying 
the patient’s intentions during and reaction to the clinical 
interaction. The taped clinical sessions and interviews 
were transcribed using literary transcription.
The Emergency Department data were gathered in two 
teaching hospitals associated with the Medical School of 
a mid-size, Midwestern university: a larger urban hospital 
and a smaller suburban hospital. The larger urban hospi-
tal served a largely uninsured, racially and ethnically 
mixed population, with a relatively high proportion of 
lower socio-economic status patients. The patient popula-
tion at the smaller suburban hospital was generally 
insured and predominantly Caucasian, with a larger pro-
portion of higher socio-economic status patients. At each 
Emergency Department, three attending and six resident 
physicians were followed during a work shift (approxi-
mately 10 hours) balanced across shifts and days of the 
week, summing up to approximately 160 hours of obser-
vations. Attending experience ranged from 5 to 31 years, 
with a mean of 13.2 years. The resident sample consisted 
of two in each of the first, second, and third years of resi-
dency. During each shift, the observed physicians saw 
between 10 and 28 patients. Given time constraints and to 
avoid disrupting care, the IRB approved only asking phy-
sicians to provide written consent, whereas patients were 
asked for their consent verbally prior to observation. For 
the same reason, demographic information could not be 
systematically collected from the patients. Conversations 
between physicians and patients as well as with the 
observer were logged by hand and later transcribed. 
Notes captured the semantic content of each conversa-
tional turn and reflected the participants’ word choices.
Initial Data Analyses
Data from the Multiple Sclerosis clinic were analyzed 
first, based on the principles of grounded theory (Strauss 
& Corbin, 2008). Initial, open coding identified decision 
making as a core category. All the data involving deci-
sions were microanalyzed for indications of underlying 
decision-making processes. This analysis included identi-
fying concepts relating to what information was present 
and how it was used, factors affecting the ultimate deci-
sion, and roles adopted by physicians and patients. 
Connections between the identified concepts revealed 
four common patterns of decision making depending on 
the distribution of information, action, and cognitive 
activities across patient and physician.
The Emergency Department data were initially coded 
with respect to environmental cues used for making deci-
sions. The initial conceptual distinctions related to singu-
lar cues such as medical history, patient preferences, or 
resource availability. Based on discussions with subject 
matter experts, these cues were then grouped into two 
functionally related categories: cues pointing to problem-
atic features of the situation and cues referring to action-
able solutions.1 Selective coding of instances based on 
this categorization led to an initial version of the Decision 
Space Model as a way to locate the observed influences 
on decision making (Feufel, 2009).
Discussions among the authors suggested that the 
decision patterns identified in the Multiple Sclerosis 
clinic data complemented the Decision Space Model 
identified from the Emergency Department data and vice 
versa. This prompted the researchers to selectively re-
code the Emergency Department data based on the deci-
sion patterns and re-interpret the Multiple Sclerosis data 
in light of the Decision Space Model. Comparative analy-
sis of selected decisions from both data sets and associ-
ated discussions by the authors helped to refine the 
conceptualization of the Decision Space Model and the 
observed decision patterns.
Final Data Analysis
A final analysis focused on close examination of decision 
making and discourse in both settings. Individual exam-
ples from Multiple Sclerosis management and the 
Emergency Department were selected to illustrate the 
decision-making patterns identified. They were selected 
because they clearly articulated cognitive, discursive, 
interpersonal, and environmental characteristics that 
were common to decisions of a particular pattern. The 
examples are representative in that they include common 
processes, but often contain higher than average ambigu-
ity or conflict in the decision parameters prompting direct 
articulation of decision-making efforts.
Results
Decision-Making Patterns
In both chronic and acute disease management situations, 
physicians and patients had access to different portions of 
the decision space. This led to decision patterns that var-
ied from primarily individual to completely distributed. 
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That is, physicians and patients each took responsibility 
for some or all stages of the decision process: identifica-
tion of the need for a decision, elaboration of parameters, 
and final choice. The specific roles adopted by patients 
and physicians depended upon each participant’s access 
to information about the state space and available actions. 
Table 1 summarizes the decision-making patterns found 
and when they typically occur.
In some cases, physicians and patients each dominated 
decisions, taking responsibility for all stages of the deci-
sion-making process. Nonetheless, the role of the other 
was often at least implicitly considered. In other cases, 
the decision tasks were split between the physician and 
patient. One actor identified the need for a decision and 
established decision-relevant parameters whereas the 
other made the final choice. The analysis below examines 
each of the decision-making patterns in detail. Parallel 
examples from Multiple Sclerosis management and the 
Emergency Department are provided for each decision 
type as convergent evidence.
Physician-Dominated Decisions
Physician-dominated decisions correspond most closely 
to the decision-making context assumed by cognitively 
oriented theories related to heuristic decision making 
(e.g., Marewski & Gigerenzer, 2012) or hypothetical-
deductive decision making (Schwartz & Elstein, 2009). 
Physician-dominated decisions occurred in both settings 
when the decision need and process were predicated on 
specialized biomedical knowledge of disease states and 
the physicians’ action space. Some physician-dominated 
decisions were completely unilateral with no provision to 
inform or include the patient in the decision. This was 
especially true when physicians followed discipline-pre-
scribed normative protocols with no complicating factors 
(e.g., patients presenting with chest pain should have an 
electrocardiogram [EKG]). However, in some physician-
dominated decisions, complicating factors required con-
sideration of the patient’s perspective.
In the management of Multiple Sclerosis, a chronic 
condition, decisions made by physicians alone were typi-
cally found at the end of the clinical encounter concern-
ing the formulation of a plan for care (Roter & Hall, 
2006). As part of this conclusion, physicians frequently 
made unilateral decisions about topics that were routine 
or highly technical, especially whether and when to send 
the patient for testing (i.e., magnetic resonance imaging 
[MRIs], bloodwork). The following example illustrates 
this process:
Physician: I am just debating. Should we repeat the MRI—
see where you’re at? Or just not do anything and wait? Like 
I said, it’s a little bit difficult to proceed. Because if we were 
going to know that you can get pregnant in the next two 
three months there is no reason to even do the MRI. And 
then again if you are going to be trying to get pregnant we’re 
not going to start your medication anyway. The only thing 
would be like if the MRI were tremendously bad, what I 
don’t expect, and then we could consider starting you on 
medication, wait? Otherwise, we’re going to try you again to 
get pregnant after you go off the medication. That’s the only 
thing I am debating right now. But I think that we’ll probably 
just wait to see, you know, how it goes.
Here, medical norms within the action space indicate a 
routine MRI, but the physician identifies a combination 
of physical constraints (medication that is contraindicated 
for pregnancy) and values (patient’s goal of becoming 
pregnant) that oppose this norm. This conflict prompts 
the physician to explore other parameters within the state 
space (probability of pregnancy and disease status) and 
how they are linked to possible actions (a diagnostic MRI 




Parameters Final Decision Characteristic Situations
Physician-
dominated
Physician responsibility Physician responsibility Physician responsibility Decision is highly technical and/or 




Either actor may be 
responsible
Physician responsibility Patient responsibility Decision is predicated on biomedical 




Either actor may be 
responsible
Patient responsibility Physician responsibility Decision is dependent upon case 
history and/or phenomenological 
information but requires physician 
action
Patient-dominated Patient responsibility Patient responsibility Patient responsibility Decisions are dependent upon patient 
evaluation of the state space and do 
not require physician action (i.e., 
self-care, self-medication)
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and medical intervention). Only after exploring these 
parameters does the physician make a final decision.
The exclusivity of the physician’s decision-making 
process here is logical. Only she has the technical exper-
tise to evaluate most of the parameters and weigh whether 
a test is medically indicated in light of the patient’s val-
ues. Although the physician does all the cognitive work in 
this case, she shifts from a first person singular construc-
tion to a first person plural. Her use of the first person 
singular demonstrates that she is in charge of the decision 
process (“I am debating”), but she shifts to a plural con-
struction when sampling options from her action space 
(“Otherwise we’re going to try you again to get pregnant 
when you go off the medication”) thereby including the 
patient. This pronoun shift indicates that this physician 
considers the decision as part of a trajectory of care that 
reflects patient involvement.
In the acute care Emergency Department setting, phy-
sician-dominated decisions occurred mainly when 
patients required immediate care, when they were inca-
pacitated and their families unavailable, or when subse-
quent action did not depend on patient preferences. 
Nevertheless, Emergency Department physicians often 
considered and vocalized at least part of the clinical rea-
soning behind their decisions to inform patients about 
what actions were to be taken and why they were justi-
fied. This type of discourse provided the patient/family 
with access to information defining the patient’s current 
state and associated care alternatives. In response, 
patients often voiced preferences for certain options 
based on their values, which the physician could then use 
to further specify next steps. Consider the following deci-
sion about recurrent chest tightness:
Attending: I couldn’t find anything with the tests, your chest 
x-ray looks fine, your enzymes are fine and they should 
show if you had problems with your heart a couple of hours 
ago. But I want to keep you here overnight.
Patient: What do they want to do?
Attending: Probably a stress test [of the patient’s heart].
Patient: Naa . . . I want to go home.
Attending: We should do at least one more blood test. You 
can go home after the blood test comes back negative and 
after I call the clinic for a follow-up appointment tomorrow.
In this example, the Emergency Department physician 
identified the need and relevant parameters (checking for 
myocardial infarction, addressing the patient’s previously 
articulated concern about hypertension) based on his bio-
medical knowledge of the state space and the available 
resources for action. More important, the physician was 
aware that he was accountable for making sure the patient 
did not suffer from an acute and severe heart problem. 
His professional norms suggested admitting the patient 
for observation overnight. To accommodate patient val-
ues, he agreed to omit admission, but only if an additional 
test came back negative. The decision for another test 
was, therefore, under the purview of the physician. 
Although the physician made all the decisions in this 
instance, by articulating his decision-making process, he 
allowed the patient to provide input resulting in a mutu-
ally acceptable trajectory for care.
In summary, despite a biomedical rationale for a par-
ticular choice, physician-dominated decisions may still 
involve and, in some cases, require coordination with 
patients’ values. In both acute and chronic disease man-
agement, the need to create a common trajectory of care 
may necessitate the articulation of the physician’s clinical 
cognition and the incorporation of the patient’s 
perspective.
Physician-Defined, Patient-Made Decisions
In physician-defined, patient-made decisions, the physi-
cian elaborates relevant parameters, and the patient 
makes a final selection. Typically, the physician presents 
information about a limited set of options, so that the 
patient can make an informed choice. This decision pat-
tern appears in the literature on shared decision making 
(Elwyn et al., 2012). Decisions of this type often occur 
when the physician’s understanding of the physical con-
straints (e.g., pathophysiology) in the state space and 
properties of the potential options in the action space 
(e.g., efficacy, side effects) is essential, but the patient 
enacts the decision (e.g., taking the medication) and 
incurs the majority of consequences (e.g., side effects, 
costs). This decision pattern reflects the interaction 
between the physician’s privileged access to biomedical 
information and the patient’s ability to act.
In Multiple Sclerosis management, decisions that fol-
low this pattern typically involve the selection of a course 
of treatment or use of complementary treatments (e.g., 
physical therapy). These decisions are technical, requir-
ing physician knowledge, but involve substantial action 
by the patient. The distributed dynamic this creates is 
especially clear when the patient’s norms conflict with 
the physician’s analysis. For example, the patient in the 
dialogue below initially refused conventional treatment 
in favor of alternative medicine. What is interesting here 
is not merely that the patient contributed to the final deci-
sion, but that to resolve the conflict, the physician rede-
fines the decision parameters.
Physician: I remember you saying that you decided not to do and 
you were saying that you were thinking more about natural 
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medicine. Copaxone® is more like a mixture of amino acids and 
so it’s milder than Betaseron®. Betaseron® is like Interferon. 
That’s why it’s a strong, little bit more synthetic I would say.
Patient: OK.
Physician: Copaxone® would be more natural. That’s the 
reason I was just, I was changing my mind. [ . . . ] So you’re 
comfortable with the Copaxone® or you prefer the 
Betaseron® medication?
Patient: Um, I read both and the Copaxone® actually 
sounded like, in the stuff that I read, sounded like something 
I’d rather do because it seemed more simple . . .
The physician begins to set up possible alternative 
courses of treatment and implied trade-offs by introducing 
a new medication (Copaxone®) and contrasting it with a 
medication she previously recommended (Betaseron®). 
She represents the chemical structure of the new medica-
tion as more compatible with the patient’s norms for 
acceptable treatments (preferences for natural medicine) 
and presents the patient with an explicit choice of medica-
tion. The patient’s selection echoes the physician’s defini-
tion of the decision parameters, accepting the medication 
as a more “natural” alternative. By refusing a course of 
action initially proposed by the physician, the patient 
expanded the set of usual decision parameters, requiring 
the physician to present a new alternative in a way that 
aligns more closely with the patient’s norms. This illus-
trates the inherent interdependence between the patient’s 
action choices and the physician’s clinical reasoning.
The dependence of clinical decision making on patient 
choice of action was also apparent in the Emergency 
Department. In one example, a 77-year-old patient fell 
and felt something “burst” in her head:
Physician: The CAT scan is showing no bleed but it’s not 
100% correct; 3-5% of all actual bleeds are not detected 
with a cat scan. The only way to be 100% sure is to do a 
spinal tap. [ . . . ] If you ask me what I think? Is that caused 
by an aneurysm? No. But the lawyers and medical experts 
tell me to do it anyway. I can’t prove it 100% in any other 
way. I will be honest with you: It’s not easy in a 77-year old 
patient. [ . . . ]
Daughter: What else can we do? What else can cause it?
Physician: Many things. [ . . . ] I suggest getting her admitted 
for observation and they can consult with neurosurgery if 
they think that’s necessary. She is sitting on the fence, 
definitely. Do you have anything against keeping her here?
Daughter: It’s up to her [looking at her mother].
Patient: [looking at her daughter]. If you think that is best for 
me.
In this example, the Emergency Department physi-
cian explained the dynamics of an aneurysm in the 
state space and gave recommendations and options for 
how to best react. Although the physician considered 
legal implications and recommended admission, he 
judged the probability of an aneurysm low, which 
allowed him to give the patient the final choice whether 
to stay in the hospital for further tests. Relative to the 
physician-dominated Emergency Department example 
presented earlier, this example demonstrates that part 
of the physician’s task is to identify which physical 
constraints warrant physician-dominated decisions and 
which allow for physician-defined, patient-made deci-
sions, which are more reflective of patient norms and 
values.
Despite domain differences, these examples from 
chronic and acute care illustrate the same pattern of dis-
tributed clinical cognition. In each case, the physician 
directs the dyad’s attention to specific physical properties 
and associated potential actions, essentially mapping pos-
sible trajectories of care. The physician then interprets 
and discusses the desirability of these trajectories in light 
of patient values and norms. The patient uses the infor-
mation and analysis from the physician to make a final 
decision. In these situations, the challenge is turning a 
distributed cognitive problem into a shared trajectory for 
reasoning about care. The physician’s efficacy depends 
on framing decisions in a way that is mindful of the 
parameters that correspond to the patient’s norms and 
values.
Patient-Defined, Physician-Made Decisions
During patient-defined, physician-made decisions, the 
patient guides the trajectory for clinical cognition. Hints 
of this pattern appear in the literature concerned with 
patients seeking the treatment of pain and infection 
(Stivers, 2002). Our analysis suggests that this pattern 
can be found more generally when the patient held privi-
leged knowledge of the state space (e.g., phenomenology 
of symptoms, case history) and the physician held powers 
of action (e.g., write prescriptions or order tests). In these 
cases, patients used their knowledge to define the param-
eters of the decision either generally or as a fixed choice 
within a limited set of actions. The physician’s role was to 
correlate the range of possible treatment options, biomed-
ical aspects of the state space, and associated decision 
parameters outlined by the patient to make a final and 
informed choice. In many cases, some or all the options 
required action by the physician, at least in the form of a 
prescription. This structure places physicians in a gate-
keeper role requiring them to make the final decision; a 
patient may prefer a particular option and set up a choice 
accordingly but cannot enact it without physician 
participation.
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In the Multiple Sclerosis clinic, patient-defined deci-
sions typically involved the treatment of symptoms intro-
duced by the patient. This is an area where the patient’s 
access to experiential information about symptoms is 
critical. Similarly, treating symptoms typically involves 
judgments about comfort and functionality rather than 
medical necessity, so the patient’s values play a larger 
role. The physician’s role is to match the patient-defined 
parameters with available medical options and provide 
access to those options she deems appropriate. In the 
example below, all these elements are at work.
Patient: I had stopped (hydrocodone) at the beginning of that 
week unfortunately been a day, a day or two, I went the 
hospital. They gave me, he wrote a script for me. Ay, ay, I 
took the medicine as soon as could. And sure you know 
within 4 hours, or actually within 20 minutes I started to feel 
better. Within an hour my quality of life just improved 
dramatically . . .
Physician: [Which medication helps you the best? Pain 
mediation?
Patient: Hydrocodone, . . . Methadone seemed to work really 
well but then when I started to taper off of it. It was, it was 
the worst thing that’s ever happened to me.
Physician: What happened?
Patient: Um, my body went into the worst type of shock. Just 
withdrawal and shock. Uh, uh, uh. I never want to take 
anything that my body becomes that reliant on.
Physician: The last thing you were on, how much did you 
take?
Patient: I brought you this. This is what, this is, this is what 
I’ve been taking. That’s what I usually take. And it just 
depends on what the pain level is. If I can take one, I take 
one . . . And like I said the Requip® it didn’t work. It didn’t 
even make me sleep and uh the Cymbalta® I just I did not 
like the way it made me feel. And it didn’t work for the pain. 
For some reason this pain is . . .
Physician: So um yeah. So I wrote down what you respond 
to and I will give you some until you get to the pain clinic
This patient had Multiple Sclerosis for a long time and 
suffered from chronic neurological pain. He had run out 
of the pain medication he usually took and wanted the 
physician to give him a new prescription. Therefore, he 
used information he had about the state space and knowl-
edge of the physician’s norms to set up decision parame-
ters intended to help the physician decide to provide the 
desired treatment. He began by describing his need for 
pain treatment as crucial, suggesting the current state 
required immediate action. He then described a negative 
withdrawal experience and his corresponding desire to 
avoid future dependence by minimizing his use of medi-
cation. This addressed the physician’s norms that access 
to narcotics should be limited because of issues of abuse. 
Finally, he limited the options for treatment, listing sev-
eral non-narcotic medications that he had tried unsuc-
cessfully. This framed the decision narrowly for the 
physician: She could leave the patient in pain until he saw 
a pain specialist or prescribe a medication that conflicted 
with norms limiting narcotic use. Ultimately, she accepted 
the patient’s implicit argument that the need to treat with 
a narcotic outweighed the addiction risk.
This interaction reflects the specific information and 
action profile that each participant had available and 
could contribute to negotiating an acceptable trajectory of 
care. The patient provided the experiential and case his-
tory information needed to support a decision and the 
physician had the authority to act and corresponding 
responsibility for judging the advisability of particular 
actions.
Similar cases were found in the Emergency Department 
when patients came in for acute exacerbations of chronic 
or recurrent conditions. Emergency physicians were also 
dependent upon the patients to provide critical informa-
tion about the state space. This process was often compli-
cated by concealed intentions as reflected in, for instance, 
exaggerated symptoms (e.g., the “narcotic-seeking” 
patient) or minimized symptoms (e.g., patients who did 
not acknowledge the intensity of their pain). The follow-
ing patient-defined, physician-made decision provides a 
more subtle illustration of the dependence on patient 
framing, conflicting with an implicit, ultimately ques-
tionable norm that patient knowledge is not immediately 
relevant or needed during acute diagnostic care. A patient 
with a complex medical history including anemia pre-
sented at the Emergency Department reporting pain in her 
back and shoulder. For about two hours, the Emergency 
Department staff explored various possible causes includ-
ing shingles and pulmonary problems. Finally, the patient 
indicated that the symptoms felt like she was “anemic 
again” and needed a transfusion. This simple framing 
altered the physician’s cognitive trajectory surrounding 
the case, suspending effort to rule out a set of potentially 
complex problems to determining anemia as a sufficient 
cause for admission and terminating emergency care 
delivery.
In both cases, the decision was split because informa-
tion about the state space and the ability to act were dis-
tributed across actors. In patient-defined, physician-made 
decisions, the patient has the information to identify the 
need for a decision but cannot or does not know how to 
translate this into action, whereas the physician has the 
knowledge of the physical constraints that allows her to 
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judge the advisability of a given action and societal 
authorization to implement it. This distribution of knowl-
edge and action yields a distribution of cognitive pro-
cesses. Given this pattern, the efficacy of the encounter 
depends on the patient’s ability and willingness to share 
experienced concerns accurately and the physician’s abil-
ity to identify viable and medically justifiable options to 
address these concerns.
Patient-Dominated Decisions
Patient-dominated decisions occur when the patient can 
act independently of the physician. This pattern appears 
in the literature concerning patient adherence (Vermeire, 
Hearnshaw, Van Royen, & Denekens, 2001). But as 
with patient-dominated, physician-made decisions, our 
analysis suggests that the patient-dominated pattern 
should be viewed as part of a wider continuum of shared 
decision making and must not be limited to the com-
mon focus on adherence. Patients independently made 
two major types of medical decisions: to seek care and 
to discontinue care. Care seeking is rarely considered in 
discussions of medical decision making because it 
takes place prior to entering the medical system. 
However, nearly all the patients in the Emergency 
Department and a few of the Multiple Sclerosis patients 
deliberately chose to seek care. When Emergency 
Department patients decide to go to urgent care, wait 
for a clinic appointment, or forego medical attention, 
they trade off the risk of missing critical treatment with 
the costs in money and time associated with an emer-
gency visit. Similarly, Multiple Sclerosis patients expe-
riencing altered symptoms make judgments about the 
urgency of medical needs (requiring care from an 
Emergency Department or through a clinical visit) and 
the proper provider (a primary care physician, neurolo-
gist, or other specialist). Because clinical cognition and 
care inherently differ depending on medical specializa-
tion, when a patient chooses a provider, they initiate a 
specific trajectory for both care and clinical cognition.
Patients do choose to stop acting in a way that has 
been previously discussed (e.g., cancel an appoint-
ment, discontinue a medication, or delay treatment). 
From the perspective of distributed cognition, such 
non-adherence reflects a failure to develop a shared 
trajectory for clinical reasoning during an inherently 
distributed task.
Most patients understand that taking action indepen-
dently from the physician is considered a violation of cul-
tural norms. As such, these decisions typically entered the 
conversation obliquely as reports of past behavior that 
influenced the current decision space. For example,
Patient: No, I don’t take Provigil® anymore.
Physician: Oh, just the Ritalin®. How were you feeling 
when you were taking both?
Patient: I never took both.
Physician: Oh, I thought that it was in the notes.
Patient: Oh no, no, no. As soon as I started taking—as he put 
me on the Ritalin®, I stopped taking Provigil® because I 
was scared to take them together.
This decision is presented at the beginning of the dia-
logue as information to include in the current state space, 
rather than at the end as a product of an articulated pro-
cess of reasoning. After reporting the decision, the patient 
works backward to reveal the issues that prompted (and 
justified) taking a deliberate action. In the Multiple 
Sclerosis clinic, many patient-dominated decisions, as 
above, could be classified as non-adherence. But, the 
patients were actually engaging in self-care according to 
their own analysis of the decision space in the absence of 
a shared trajectory for clinical reasoning between patient 
and provider.
Given that Emergency Department physicians gener-
ally do not follow their patients, there were no similar 
cases of patient’s choosing to modify previously agreed 
upon treatment regimens. However, physicians were 
aware that patients leaving the hospital ultimately made 
their own treatment decisions. Discussions surrounding 
patients’ decisions ranged from pragmatic (e.g., unhappy 
patients may not disclose relevant information or may 
require additional attention—“Let’s get people admitted 
and clean up triage [ . . . ] I don’t want to have those 
people [ . . . ] come back in three hours and we have to 
deal with them then.”) to helpful (e.g., providing resources 
for patient self-care) to pejorative (e.g., a comment that a 
patient would “have to choose between meds and cigs”) 
to ethical (e.g., consideration of patient preferences when 
deciding to treat, admit, or discharge a patient). In this 
sense, the patient’s unique role as the final decision maker 
and actor was also part of the context informing decision 
making in the Emergency Department.
Limitations
This study is limited by constraints on data collection by 
observation as well as the selected settings. Our presence 
during data collection was apparent to physicians, 
patients, and family members. We view the risk of influ-
ence on physicians as minimal due to the critical nature of 
their professional responsibilities. We also view the risk 
of influence on patients as minimal, due to the critical 
nature of the concerns that motivated their quest for med-
ical care. Although the use of two different types of care 
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suggests a degree of generalizability, in other medical set-
tings specific aspects of the decision space may influence 
the distribution of cognitive processes in ways that are 
not anticipated by this study. For instance, the technical 
foundations of decisions in an Intensive Care Unit might 
alter the way that patients and physicians approach deci-
sion making or the feasibility of all patterns.
Given that we used two existing data sets, we were not 
able collect data in a motivated fashion to confirm the 
developing theory or to verify that data saturation was 
achieved. However, the relatively large corpus available 
for analysis and the convergence of two data sets suggests 
that the data were sufficient to support the findings pre-
sented. In retrospect, the observed decision patterns rep-
resent a logical spectrum of the distribution of 
decision-making responsibility, even if they may not 
include all possible variations.
Finally, the focused analysis of decision making 
based on the Decision Space Model does not substitute 
for a holistic ethnography of medical decision making in 
the observed domains of the health care system. That is, 
the model offers a way to conceptualize, categorize, and 
discuss the influences on decision making, but does not 
elucidate the specific socio-cultural and technical pro-
cesses that create these influences in chronic and acute 
care. Future research is needed to explore the meaning 
of and role that specific chronic illnesses such as 
Multiple Sclerosis, or acute health problems such as 
heart attacks or strokes, play in structuring decision-
making situations.
Conclusion
This study suggests a reconceptualization of medical 
decision making in terms of the distributed cognition 
paradigm. We began with the Decision Space Model to 
clarify the relationship between physical and social influ-
ences on decision making. Using concrete instances, we 
demonstrated that both patients and physicians consider 
these influences when identifying the need for a decision, 
searching for relevant decision parameters, making 
actionable decisions, and developing satisfactory care 
trajectories. Depending on the specific access of patients 
and physicians to information and resources for action, 
we identified four different patterns of decision making in 
both acute and chronic care settings. These patterns form 
a continuum of shared decision making, uniting the tradi-
tional decision-making researcher’s focus on physician-
led decisions and patient participation with the 
practitioner’s concern for assessing patients’ needs and 
problems of adherence. In other words, these patterns 
help to integrate issues raised in different literatures into 
a more general framework fusing individual and shared 
decision making.
The physician-dominated decision, prevalent in the 
cognitively oriented decision-making literature was only 
one of several observed decision patterns. Moreover, 
even in these situations, some instances required knowl-
edge, or at least consideration, of the patient’s interpreta-
tion of the decision space—their norms, values, and 
opportunities to act—for effective and justifiable deci-
sions. Other observed patterns included split-decisions 
where one party specified the parameters of the decision 
and the other party made a final decision and decisions 
that were made only by patients. The consistent theme 
across the identified decision patterns is that medical 
decisions are predicated on the division of information 
and the ability to act. Thus, the participation of both phy-
sicians and patients in decision making is not just socially 
desirable, as suggested by the shared decision-making 
paradigm, but the inevitable result of the distribution of 
clinical cognition.
This study yielded three key findings. First, medical 
decision making is fundamentally distributed between 
physicians and patients; this is true not only in chronic 
disease management but also occurs in acute care. 
Second, the ways in which actors conceptualize and eval-
uate physical, personal, and socio-cultural constraints on 
the decision space can vary substantially, emphasizing 
the need to negotiate problems and solutions and to create 
shared trajectories for clinical cognition. Effectively, 
each actor’s understanding of the decision space becomes 
a constraint on the state space of every other actor. Finally, 
the different patterns of shared decision making we iden-
tified suggest that in natural environments, decision mak-
ing is a temporally extended process including the 
identification of a decision point, the definition and 
assessment of relevant parameters, and the final choice, 
which represents but one episode in a care trajectory. The 
distribution and organization of these tasks depend on 
actors’ understanding of and physically and socially con-
strained capacity to act within the decision space.
These findings have implications for both theoreti-
cally and clinically oriented work. First, the Decision 
Space Model unites cognitive-behavioral processes, 
physical constraints, and socio-cultural considerations. In 
examples from the management of both chronic and acute 
care, the interplay of informational, physical, and socio-
cultural perspectives became evident in nearly every 
interaction. Even when physicians were making highly 
technical decisions, they accounted for socio-cultural 
constraints in addition to purely biomedical and resource 
considerations. From a theoretical perspective, this sug-
gests that experimental research on medical cognition, 
most of which is phrased in terms of probabilistic bio-
medical concerns, fails to account for a substantial por-
tion of the decision process. It also suggests a need for 
more research into the cognitive processes underlying 
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shared decision making and for medical education to 
train professionals how to negotiate the interplay of 
social, resource, and biomedical considerations.
Second, the Decision Space Model suggests that deci-
sion making spans actors’ conceptualization of the envi-
ronment and their opportunities and requirements for 
action. Analysis based on this assumption helped to iden-
tify a multi-stage decision process involving the identifi-
cation of decision points, refinement of decision 
parameters, and a final decision. A focus on the division 
of available information and action opportunities between 
actors underscores the pervasive distribution of cognitive 
processes along this temporal trajectory. On a theoretical 
level, the observed dynamics between state and action 
spaces suggest that decision-making research needs to be 
sensitive to more than just final decisions. More research 
is needed to understand how the relationship between 
state and action space triggers the need for a decision and 
defines the parameters to be considered during the final 
decision.
Finally, the expanded Decision Space Model incorpo-
rates contributions from multiple actors. When informa-
tion, cognition, and action are distributed, actors must 
inform one another about relevant influences (including 
implicit norms and values) and clearly communicate 
decision parameters to allow for common ground (e.g., 
Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992) and coherent decisions. 
This finding highlights the core contributions patients 
make to clinical cognition, including patterns of decision 
making that are patient led, which have typically been 
overlooked or dismissed as “non-adherence.” Unless 
physicians and patients transform the distributed task into 
a shared cognitive trajectory, physicians may misdiag-
nose symptoms or patients may be unable (or unwilling) 
to comply with prescribed treatments. Thus, on a clinical 
level, medical staff should be trained and patients should 
be asked to communicate their understanding of state and 
action space so that mismatches can be identified early. 
Our findings further suggest that studying patients’ rea-
soning processes—including prior to entering the health 
care system—is important to better understand the extent 
to which decisions are necessarily shared and that limit-
ing research to medical decision making in the doctor’s 
office risks reinforcing a limited paternalistic model.
In summary, the results suggest a need for both exten-
sion and integration of current models of medical deci-
sion making. First, a better understanding of shared 
decision making will require consideration of the role of 
distributed medical, physical, and social factors in physi-
cians’ and patients’ reasoning. It also will require an 
extended focus on processes related to the identification 
of decision needs and the search for decision parameters, 
in addition to those involved in the final decision. Second, 
the identified decision-making patterns unite researchers’ 
and clinicians’ concerns with a common underlying 
framework of distributed medical decision making. By 
expanding the Decision Space Model with the observed 
patterns of distributed cognition, the future research 
agenda is substantially clarified: The four dimensions of 
the decision space pose different specific possibilities of 
individual and shared responsibility for decision making 
to investigate.
From an applied perspective, the interdependence of 
physician and patient cognition suggests that a goal for 
improving clinical decisions should not only be to instruct 
physicians to engage intentionally in shared decision 
making, that is, a change in attitudes. Training should 
rather focus on helping physicians and patients under-
stand and improve upon the ways they already adapt their 
cognition to accommodate the division of information 
and resources for action. This way both parties may be 
empowered to better coordinate information, cognition, 
and action and thereby improve the quality of care, adher-
ence, and treatment outcomes.
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Note
1. The validity of these categories was independently sup-
ported by a statistical factor analysis of another data set 
collected in this setting, which found an equivalent distinc-
tion—cues related to goal establishment and goal enact-
ment—to describe physician information seeking behavior 
(Robinson 2011).
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